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FOREWORD
In 1985 the University of Zimbabwe and Michigan State University initiated a Food 
Security Research Network for Southern Africa. The objectives of the network are 
to conduct research that informs policymakers about food security issues and to help 
strengthen the regional capacity for food policy analyis. The underlying premise of 
the network is that building excellence in research capacity for national policy 
analysis comes through experience. In practice, this requires a long-term 
commitment to analytical capacity building, consistency in funding, and constant 
interaction between researchers and policymakers.
The network has sponsored four annual conferences for network researchers, 
policymakers, SADCC officials, and representative of international and donor 
agencies. The aim of the conference is to share research findings, identify new 
research themes, and provide an opportunity for policy dialogue between regional 
researchers, policymakers, and government officials.
The 1988 conference brought together 110 participants who deliberated on 28 
papers. In the Official Opening, Vice-Chancellor W J. Kamba of the Univesity of 
Zimbbawe highlighted the importance of including health related-issues as a 
component of food security; and Zimbabwe’s Senior Minister of Finance, Economic 
Planning, and Development B.T.G. Chidzero outlined policy reform priorities for 
Southern Africa. Subsequent sessions focused on SADCC’s Food Security 
Programme, the Impact o f Market Reform on Food Security, Food Security Policy 
Options, New Technology to Improve Food Security, Family Food Security Options in 
Low-Rainfall Areas, Expanding Agricultural Trade in the SADCC Region, Nutrition and 
Food Security, the Contribution o f Small-Scale Rural Enterprises to Employment 
Generation and Food Security, and the Impact o f Irrigation on Food Security.
A highlight of the 1988 conference was the participation of five nutritionists from 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sweden, and the United States. The presence of the 
nutritionists stimulated formal and informal discussions on the food access side of 
the food security equation and drew attention to the need to initiate more research 
in this area.
A second highlight of the 198» conference was the attention given to reducing 
barriers to expanded intraregional trade in the SADCC region. Results presented 
suggest that there appear to be substantial price and nonprice barriers to expanded 
trade. Nevertheless, there exist significant opportunities for expanding intraregional 
trade that can be realized through appropriate government initiatives.
This proceeding contains revised papers prepared under the sponsorship of the 
University of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University Food Security Research Project 
in Southern Africa and presented at the University of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Annual 
Conference on Food Security Research in Southern Africa, held at the Holiday Inn, 
Harare, October 31-November 3, 1988.
Godfrey Mudimu and Richard H. Bernsten 
Co-Directors
UZ/MSU Food Security Research Project 
University of Zimbabwe
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND 
ITS IMPACT ON FOOD SECURITY: 
THE ZAMBIAN CASE
Kapola F. Sipula1, John T. Milimo1, C. Mwila1 and David K. Mendamcnda2
INTRODUCTION
The agricultural policy objectives of the Zambian Government, as stated in the Third 
National Development Plan are; to achieve a satisfactory level of food self-sufficiency; 
increase export crop production to broaden the export base of the economy; and, 
to promote the economic development of the rural areas. Through the various 
national development plans initiated since independence in 1964, the government 
placed increasing emphasis on agriculture in an effort to "minimize the inherited 
imbalance between the urban and rural sectors and reduce the countries dependence 
on copper exports" (Zambia Government 1979, p. 139).
Government has used several major policy instruments to achieve the above 
mentioned policy objectives. This paper analyzes the impact of four of these policy 
instruments on food security over the past five years, namely: price controls, crop 
marketing policies and practices, consumer and producer subsidies, and foreign 
exchange controls.
HISTORICAL SETTING
In the first decade after independence, Zambia’s copper-based economy was very 
strong. When copper prices started to fall in the mid-1970s, Zambia’s economy 
deteriorated rapidly. Zambia’s external debt rose with no hope of ever improving 
the situation by relying on traditional copper earnings. Hence, government decided 
to embark on the New Economic Recovery Programme, with the support of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and a number of the major bilateral donors.
To qualify for assistance from these donors, Zambia agreed to carry out major 
economic reforms. In the agricultural sector, this included the liberalization of 
agricultural marketing, withdrawal of food subsidies, and devaluation of the currency. 
This paper analyzes these changes and the effects they have had on the food security 
situation in the country.
'Rural Development Studies Bureau, University of Zambia, Lusaka.
National Commission for Development Planning.
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PRICE POLICIES AND SUBSIDIES
The Zambian government has used price regulation as a major instrument to control 
not only food prices, but also prices of manufactured goods. Government has 
regulated food prices since independence in order to make food available to the 
majority of the people in the country. This measure has created the need for many 
other regulations.
Input price controls
In Zambia, retail input prices have reflected government’s desire to stimulate food 
production without unduly increasing the costs of food to urban consumers. Input 
prices, especially for fertilizer, have been controlled and subsidized (Table 1). These 
subsidies have encouraged farmers to use fertilizers, especially for maize production. 
Nitrogenous fertilizer use increased by 25% from 1972 to 1983. Total fertilizer 
consumption increased by 58% from 1976 to 1983 (Ginder, 1983). Since 1986, the 
fertilizer subsidy has been reduced drastically, resulting in the nominal price of 
fertilizers more than doubling.
The increased use of fertilizer on ipaize resulted from more small-scale farmers 
shifting away from other crops. Through both research and extension, the
Table 1. Fertilizer subsidy to farmers and price of fertilizers, Zambia, 1972-87.
Year
Fertilzer
subsidy
(Kwacha/mt)
Price of 
compound D 
(Kwacha/50 kg)
Price of 
urea
(Kwacha/50 kg)
1972 na 2.75 2.80
1973 na 3.50 3.55
1974 na 4.00 0.05
1975 na 4.00 0.05
1976 158 6.55 0.75
1977 106 6.55 0.75
1978 153 6.55 0.75
1979 91 8.55 0.75
1980 210 11.60 1.65
1981 230 9.60 0.65
1982 227 11.75 0.95
1983 166 14.95 4.95
1984 na 24.10 4.10
1985 na 26.75 6.75
1986 na 80.00 3.00
1987 na 80.00 3.00
na indicates data not available 
Source: NFNC and IFPRI (1985)
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government promoted hybrid maize. Although hybrid maize requires more fertilizer 
than local varieties, it is more difficult to store. As a result, family food insecurity 
may have increased.
Input price control has had several effects on Zambian agriculture. First, it has 
had the positive effect of helping to increase maize production, except during 
drought periods. Small-scale semi-commercial farmers increased their share of 
marketed maize from about 20% at independence to about 60% in recent years. 
The fertilizer subsidy, together with other policy measures, has encouraged farmers 
to produce more maize in almost every part of the country.
The second effect of input price controls has been that the input subsidy mostly 
benefited the large-scale commercial farmers. Therefore, the subsidy was mis­
directed.
Third, the subsidy bill for inputs increased to the point that the government had 
to rethink its whole policy. The government also faced the lack of foreign exchange. 
Following its decision to discontinue food subsidies, a decision encouraged and in the 
main inspired by most of the large donors, fertilizer subsidies were substantially 
reduced, resulting in higher fertilizer prices as shown in Table 1. However, the 
removal of the subsidies and the consequent sharp rise in fertilizer costs do not 
appear to have reduced agricultural productivity. In fact, production of maize in 
particular has increased rather than decreased.
Because of the government promotion of maize, more and more farmers 
throughout the country began to adopt maize as their cash and food crop, changing 
the regional pattern of production. Provinces like the Eastern and Northern 
Provinces were/are becoming much more important as maize producing areas than 
ever before. Clearly, factors in addition to input price controls influenced this 
development.
Output price controls
The government has tried to control producer prices of food crops for several 
reasons. First, uncontrolled producer prices would result in higher consumer prices 
and defeat the government’s policy of providing inexpensive food. If consumer 
subsidies were to be provided in such a case, the explicit subsidy levels would be far 
larger than if the state controlled the price and marketed the staple commodity, 
maize.
Second, government has controlled the output price to prevent a few commercial 
farmers, or a strong trading community, from gaining control of the potentially 
profitable maize market. Thus, government has controlled the price to encourage 
smallholder maize production.
Third, to encourage commercial farmers to shift from maize to export crops, 
government has increased the producer prices of many agricultural commodities 
(Table 2).
Furthermore, government has introduced what are considered attractive official 
prices for millet, sorghum, and cassava in an effort to develop rural markets in these 
crops. From 1980 to 1988 the nominal producer price of maize increased by more 
than 500%. Other crop prices increased within approximately the same range.
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Table 2, Agricultural producer prices (Kwacha/90kg bag), Zambia, 1979 to 1988.
Year Maize Sorghum Millet Wheat Soyabean
1979 9.20 6.00 6.00 20.00 25.00
1980 11.70 6.00 6.00 20.00 32.00
1981 13.50 9.00 6.00 26.00 36.30
1982 16.00 9.00 6.00 32.00 42.00
1983 18.30 16.00 29.00 35.75 45.30
1984 24.50 18.65 29.50 42.50 52.50
1985 28.32 26.90 38.10 45.20 60.90
1986 55.00 52.75 56.25 84.40 112.10
1987 78.00 74.00 74.00 111.00 148.00
1988 80.00 76.00 60.00 190.00 217.50
Wheat prices were also increased to promote import substitution.
The price of maize remains controlled to the present, whereas for other crops the 
government prices are floor prices. For example, the floor price for soyabeans was 
K217 per bag, but last season farmers could get as much as K240 per bag from 
private and parastatal buyers. Soyabeans are rapidly becoming an important cash 
crop for many small-scale farmers in preference to maize. This may pose a problem 
of food security for this category of farmers.
The current pricing system is intended to promote both cash and food crops 
throughout the whole country. Farmers are left with a difficult choice on growing 
cash crops and purchasing food on the market, or growing food crops and selling the 
surplus. The response appears to be the same throughout the country-farmers are 
opting to grow cash crops. Maize is also becoming more as a cash crop, particularly 
for small-scale farmers. While maize is still sold through the cooperative movement 
and the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD), other crops and 
livestock are freely traded in the open market.
Increased agricultural production seems to be directly related to rather large 
increases in producer prices. However, in the final analysis, an increase in producer 
prices, or even decontrol of producer prices, does not automatically lead to an 
increase in agricultural production.
Pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing
The uniform pricing system has contributed to the low productivity of the agricultural 
sector, particularly among traditional farm households. For example, farmers in 
regions which do not have a comparative advantage in maize growing have continued 
to grow maize with little success.
Much of the increase in maize production has been through an increase in the 
area planted. Labour and other resources have shifted from traditional crops such 
as sorghum, millet, and cassava which are less vulnerable to weather variability. 
Pan-seasonal pricing has induced farmers to sell more maize to the official marketing
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channels and store less on the farm, as shown by a recent study in the Eastern 
Province (IFPRI and NFNC, 1985).
With less maize being stored on-farms and with distant places producing more 
for the urban market, government’s cost of handling maize has increased. For 
example, in the 1988 budget speech it was disclosed that it cost the government K49 
to handle a 90 kg bag of maize before it reached the millers. A major outcome of 
tins policy has been that the farmers who depended on sorghum, cassava, millet, and 
local maize varieties for food switched to hybrid maize as a cash crop—making them 
more vulnerable to transitory food insecurity. High reliance on cash incomes for 
food have been linked to lower nutritional levels among households following this 
practice (IFPRI and NFNC, 1985).
The maize pricing system has also increased the government’s cost to provide 
inexpensive food to all the people with access to subsidized maize (mealie meal). 
Consumers, especially in urban areas, have been purchasing maize meal at less than 
half the real value of the processed commodity (IAS and ERG, 1988). The 
government has borne the difference, thus contributing to a the budget deficit.
Consumer pricing and subsidies
For crops such as rice, sorghum, millet, and cassava, rural market prices reflect both 
regional and seasonal differences vis-a-vis their major production sites (NFNC and 
IFPRI, 1985). The markets for these crops are rudimentary and involve very small 
quantities. There is also no subsidy offered on processed products made from these 
crops. However, for maize the rural market is almost nonexistent. There is little 
rural storage for off-season sales or for own consumption. Especially in areas where 
subsidized maize meal is readily available, farmers sell their crop as soon as the 
marketing season opens and start purchasing maize flour from the market.
In normal rainfall years, there has been an increase in the production of maize 
throughout the country. The marketed figures are approaching the production 
figures because producers retain little maize for consumption, as noted above. This 
also has resulted in increased demand for the industrially-milled maize products, 
which is not surprising considering the large subsidy offered on the final product.
The Analysis o f the 1988 Budget o f Zambia (IAS and ERG, 1988) estimated that 
the total subsidy on maize (handling, storage, and milling represented K155.55 per 
annum per person. A subsidy of K79.23 per 90 kg bag of maize or K77.79 per 
month per average family was offered to the consumers. For an urban family the 
subsidy was between K100 and K113 per month. The report added that subsidies 
on consumer products do not generally help the rural population which either 
produces its own food or has little access to the subsidized and often scarce 
commodity. Also, because the food subsidies are generally aimed at the urban 
population, they further encourage rural-to-urban migration.
In the past two years, Zambia has actually experienced a drastic increase in 
demand for subsidized mealie meal in rural areas throughout the country. This 
problem was more prominent during the late 1987 and early 1988 when severe 
shortages of mealie meal were experienced throughout the country. Although the 
mealie meal problem was worsened by the draught, the changed crop production
patterns have been equally important. Traditional cassava, millet, and sorghum­
eating areas have shifted to consuming more maize meal and have reduced their 
production of other food crops.
In December 1986 mealie meal prices were doubled, but as a result of rioting in 
the Copperbelt, the government rescinded the price increase. The maize flour 
subsidy has absorbed a considerable portion of its revenues. In 1986 18.8 % of the 
government expenditures were spent on the subsidies (Table 3). In the 1988 budget 
the amount earmarked for subsidies equalled 42% of the total deficit. Maize 
subsidies alone (handling and milling) are expected to reach K948.3 million in 1988. 
Although the maize subsidy is designed to help the rural and urban poor, it also 
benefits net-food buyers and high income earners. Therefore, the government is now 
trying to reduce the maize subsidiy by targeting it to the needy.
The maize subsidy has significantly contributed to the deficit, which in turn has 
fueled inflation—making manufactured goods and inputs extremely expensive. The 
terms of trade between the rural and the urban areas have weighed heavily against 
the former. Inflation has also seriously affected the low income, relative to the high 
income, group.
Consumer price statistics indicate that a basket of goods that could be purchased 
for K100.00 in 1975 would cost low-income consumers K788.40 and high income 
consumers K787.20 in 1986 (CSO, 1987). For food items (reported together with 
beverages and tobacco), the 1987 price index was 807.7 for the low-income group 
and 815.5 for the high-income group. Since the low-income group spends over 70% 
of their income on food, despite the high maize meal subsidy, increase in the price 
of the staple food (mealie meal) would therefore threaten the food security of the 
low income group. This is why the government is very cautious about removing the 
maize subsidy.
Current reports indicate that the incidence of malnutrition is increasing and that 
it is greater in rural areas (IFPRI and NFNC, 1985). This is mainly because food
Table 3. The cost of maize subsidies, Zambia, 1982 to 1987.
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Year GRZ own revenues Subsidies
Million Kwacha Million Kwacha Percent
1982 841.0 154.0 18.3
1983 1,016.1 82.2 8.1
1984 1,092.1 90.5 8.3
1985 1,546.7 188.4 12.2
1986 3,035.6 569.9 18.8
1987 4,279.8 676.0 15.8
Source: Ministry of Finance (various years).
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availability, especially during the drought, is extremely low due to extensive food 
sales through the official marketing channels. The combined impact of price and 
subsidy policy instruments is to induce smallholders to shift their resources away 
from traditional food crops to cash crop production, including maize. Maize is 
increasingly grown as a cash crop and the income obtained from it is used to 
purchase industrially-milled mealie meal. Thus, the demand for industrial-milled 
mealie meal has increased not only in urban areas, but also in rural areas. In 
addition, population growth increases the demand for maize throughout the whole 
country.
As a consequence of the pricing policies noted above, both net food buyers and 
net food sellers benefit from the subsidized staple food item, mealie meal.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
To achieve the goal of providing inexpensive food to the people through subsidies, 
it was necessary to create new institutions for this purpose. Since government did 
not consider small grains to be an important food crop until the 1980s, no institution 
was charged with the responsibility to purchase these crops.
NAMBOARD
The most important and well-known Zambian marketing board is the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD). Since the government sought to 
control both input and output prices, it was necessary to arrest private traders who 
would not observe fixed prices.
Through NAMBOARD, the government provided subsidized inputs to farmers, 
purchased maize at controlled prices, and sold to private millers who could then 
sell their products at the controlled prices. For example, before May 1987 
NAMBOARD purchased a 90 kg bag of maize at K55.00 and sold it at K35.00 to 
millers. The difference of K20 was absorbed by the government as an explicit 
subsidy.3
The milling industry
As a result of the food riots in December of 1986, the government declared the 
milling industry a strategic industry. Events preceding the riots are important to 
understand the incident. To reduce the subsidy bill and still provide assistance to the 
most needy citizens, the government decided to subsidize only roller meal, the type 
of mealie meal believed to be consumed by the majority of the low income earners. 
(The other type, breakfast meal, was not to be subsidized). Further, just before the
Government control of maize marketing is not a post-independence phenomenon; rather, it goes 
back to the 1940s when the then colonial government decided to provide inexpensive food to the 
miners.
proposed decontrol of the price of breakfast meal, the government intended to 
transfer the point of the roller meal subsidy from NAMBOARD to the millers in 
order to further reduce the subsidy bill.
During the transition in the locus and method of subsidy, shortages of mealie meal 
occurred. The shortages developed because the mechanism for millers to recover 
the subsidy had not been worked out beforehand, and millers feared they would not 
be able to recover the costs for producing and selling subsidized roller meal. 
Consequently, most of the millers produced the price-decontrolled breakfast meal, 
which was being sold at K78 per 50 kg bag compared to roller meal which remained 
at K28.70 per 50 kg bag.
To urban low income earners with monthly wages below K300 per month (CSO 
1987), the cost of the breakfast meal alone would have taken over 90% of their 
salary, since roller meal was not available4. Thus, the volatile urban population was 
left with very little to do but to protest. Govenment blamed the millers, mainly 
private firms for the shortages, and subsequently took over the industry.
Taking over the milling industry enabled government to more easily channel the 
staple food subsidy to the low-income group. Currently, cooperative unions, district 
councils, and parastatals run the maize meal industry. A few small private mill 
owners still operate in rural areas, but licenses are required if they are to purchase 
any maize from government stocks. Most of the small millers have problems in 
obtaining these licenses and therefore function as service millers to people who 
bring their own maize for milling.
The subsidy is paid to the millers when they provide receipts of their sales to 
retailers or consumers. The change on the point of subsidy appears to be operating 
well, but it has not reduced the subsidy bill. As previously noted, it cost as much as 
K49 per 90 kg bag for handling, even before the maize was milled. Additional costs 
were incurred for milling, distribution, storage, and retail.
During late 1987 (November and December) and early 1988 (January, February, 
and March), Zambians faced a serious shortage of both breakfast and roller meal. 
The main cause of the shortage is yet to be determined. The milling industry 
insisted that their production was normal and that there was adequate capacity to 
satisfy the national demand. Also, the government maintained that there was no 
maize shortage as additional supplies had been imported from Zimbabwe and Kenya.
Several reasons have been proposed to explain the problem that besieged the 
whole country. One view argued that demand among the rural food producers 
drastically increased because the price differentials between producer and consumer 
products make it rational for farmers to sell their maize and purchase subsidized 
maize meal. Furthermore, it does not pay to store maize on the farm, especially 
since hybrid maize does not store well under present on-farm storage technology. 
Whatever the reasons for the maize meal shortages in 1987 and early 1988, the fact 
remains that Zambia is highly susceptible to transitory food insecurity.
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4Even among the low-income group, a large percentage actually consumed breakfast meal, not roller 
meal.
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Unfortunately, food producers are contributing to the size of this group under threat. 
Institutions charged with the responsibility to ensure food security to the nation 
cannot do their work under unfavorable conditions and without the necessary inputs.
On the other hand, institutions charged with handling nonfood crops and beef 
have performed relatively well. The tobacco industry increased its exports. The beef 
industry has also increased its exports through the parastatal (CSBZ) and private 
initiatives. Throughout the country, prices of meat and meat products have increased 
to well over 300% from 1982 to 1987 due to the deregulation of the prices.
The operations of NAMBOARD and cooperatives have contributed to the food 
insecurity of food producers. The fact that the maize marketing period lasts for only 
a short period (May to June/July) forces farmers to sell their maize as soon as the 
marketing season begins. In 1988, government provided an incentive for farmers 
who sold their dry maize in April--an additional K25 per 90 kg bag above the 
producer price of K80 per bag to assist farmers to cover the cost of drying. By 
providing this incentive, the government hoped to then acquire maize stocks for 
milling, as they had almost run out. It is hoped that in the future when the stocks 
are high, the government can provide a similar incentive for people to store maize 
on farm and receive a higher price later. Longer on-farm retentions would reduce 
national grain losses and make maize available for households needs.
Impact on the private sector
The creation of government market institutions was partially designed to prevent 
private traders from taking part in the marketing of essential crops. For example, 
the government did not want a small group of traders to dominate the market in 
such essential food products as maize for fear of exploiting the farmers. The result 
is that there is little private trading in rural areas, except for small quantities of 
traditional crops. Government retail shops such as the Zambia Consumer and 
Buying Corporation (ZCBC), Mwaisehi, and National Import and Export 
Corporation (NIEC) stores distribute mealie meal in rural areas.
Private participation is present in the processing' sector to a small extent. 
Hammer-mill owners in Zambia do not have their own stocks of maize, but operate 
only as service millers. Small grains are milled at the household level. The Small 
Industries Development Organization, (SIDO), is hoping to introduce dehullers in 
rural areas to encourage greater utilization of small grains and, hence, assist in 
achieving food security.
The current arrangements in the maize market are such that operating a mill in 
a rural area on a private basis is unprofitable, unless the miller can claim subsidies 
from the government. The presence of mealie meal in state shops in most of the 
rural areas (the coverage may be low), the lack of spare parts, and the pricing 
conditions have discouraged small-processing businesses. Large maize-milling 
operations have been prohibited in Zambia since December 1986. Only cooperative 
unions, district councils, and parastatal companies are allowed in the industry. As 
a result, employment opportunities in the rural areas from this sector have been 
depressed. Depending on mealie meal from large mills has also required rural 
people to travel long distances and has sometimes caused maize meal shortages.
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This is in addition to the costs incurred in moving maize from production areas to 
the mills and maize meal back to the consumers.
Marketing policy options
The motive for government (both the colonial government and the GRZ) to 
intervene in the marketing of maize, the main staple food of urban Zambia, can 
easily be appreciated. Nevertheless, the problems and bottlenecks in the whole 
agricultural sector caused by this intervention need to be addressed. First, the 
intervention has been at a very high cost to government because of the heavy 
subsidies it has been forced to make. In 1986 the subsidy level rose to 69% of the 
total budget allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development.
Obviously this state of affairs has grave consequences for food production as it 
brings to a standstill most of the other essential agricultural services that are vital to 
increasing food production. In any case, the Zambian government does not have the 
money to sink into the bottomless pit of subsidies. When it is be forced to stop the 
subsidies because it does not have the funds, then other social and indeed political 
problems will arise.
On the other hand, to suddenly abandon the subsidies is equally suicidal. As has 
been pointed out earlier, a majority of the people spend as much as 70% of their 
incomes on the maize flour which is heavily subsidized. Without the subsidy, the 
commodity would be completely out of their reach.
Another aspect of having official boards solely in charge of marketing the main 
staple is the question of the ability of those boards to effectively carry out their 
mandate. In the first place, neither NAMBOARD nor the provincial cooperative 
unions have adequate transport to haul the produce to safety before the onset of the 
rains. Consequently, substantial amounts of the badly needed crop goes to waste.
In the second place, these official agencies do not generally have sufficient money 
to pay farmers for their produce. This results in late payments, which in turn 
discourages farmers from growing the staple. Instead, they grow other cash crops 
whose marketing is more efficiently managed, such as cotton. Cotton growers 
receive all the necessary inputs, including extension advice, on time and are paid for 
their produce soon after they deliver it to the marketing board.
It is the strong opinion of the authors of this paper that all the fuss, and more 
importantly, the large crop losses that occur during the harvest and marketing season 
could be avoided if maize storage was further decentralized. More all-weather rural 
depots could be constructed, which would store the produce until it is required 
elsewhere in the country later in the year. In addition, farmers would keep more of 
their maize and store it on-farm if there were incentives, such as being able to sell 
it at a higher price later in the year when there was an increased demand.
MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES 
AND FOOD SECURITY
Monetary and fiscal policies have a bearing on the food security situation in so far 
as they affect the whole economy. Zambia has experienced changes in monetary and
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fiscal policies since the mid-1970s, the turning point when world market trends were 
no longer favorable to Zambia. Prior to this period, even though the agricultural 
sector could not provide the needed cheap food for the urban population, food 
imports were easily financed through copper revenues. The mineral revenues also 
supported a relatively good purchasing power for the Kwacha. After 1973-74 when 
copper prices fell and oil bills increased drastically, Zambia found itself without 
foreign exchange to easily import food and other goods and services. Clark and 
Keen (1988) reported that the terms of trade index (which measures trends in export 
prices compared with trends in import prices) fell from 100 in the early 1970s to just 
24 in 1982. This meant that Zambia had to export more than four times as much 
in order to import the same value of goods.
Zambia has introduced several monetary and fiscal policies to ensure that food 
which can easily be grown locally is not imported.
Introduction of the foreign exchange auction
After having had a fixed exchange rate throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
government realized that the Kwacha was overvalued. Agriculture is one sector that 
employed imported capital-intensive production methods in the midst of abundant 
labour. The commercial farmers who could get foreign exchange from the Bank of 
Zambia (the Central Bank allocates the scarce foreign exchange) imported 
machinery and irrigation equipment, particularly to produce wheat and soyabean. 
The demand for wheat products has increased in the urban areas, despite the fact 
that Zambia cannot produce even one-third of its wheat requirements. The 
increased wheat demand has been due to both the exchange rate and foreign food 
aid which made wheat products cheap.
In October 1985 the Government, with the help and urging of the IMF devalued 
the Kwacha to the US dollar exchange rate through the use of a foreign exchange 
auctioning system. The foreign exchange auction was to be supported by other 
market liberalization measures such as reducing the budget deficit, decontrolling 
interest rates, liberalizing imports, and reducing the money supply. By April 1987, 
the Kwacha declined in value from K2.23 to US$1.00 in October 1985 to K21.01 to 
US$1.00.
Impact of the auction
The major effect on these policies increased the cost of imported goods, which 
pulled up the prices of all other commodities. Inflation started running around 60%. 
Workers sought higher wages in order to restore their purchasing power. Firms that 
were not successful in bidding for foreign exchange, but were highly dependent on 
imported materials for their production, started laying off workers. Therefore, 
unemployment was not arrested by the auctioning system.
Agriculture was affected in several ways by the auction. Some commercial farmers 
started utilizing more labour-intensive production technologies. Use of oxen power 
increased significantly as the prices of imported machinery, fuel, and spares 
increased. The effect on rural employment is not clearly known as the period of 
auction was too short. Inflation obviously changed the terms of trade between rural
and urban areas. Prices of agricultural products such as maize were still being 
controlled, but urban manufactured goods were not.
The agricultural sector did not benefit much from the auctioning system which was 
ended on the 1st of May 1987, with the currency fixed at K8.00 to the US$1.00. 
Exports of a few crops and livestock products did increase. Generally, however, 
most of the agricultural producers were outbid and could not adjust quickly enough 
to employ more local resources. This occurred despite the fact that agriculture was 
given a separate window. Since interest rates were also decontrolled, farmers found 
it extremely difficult to borrow money from the banks. Small-scale farmers, who 
only needed money to purchase inputs within the country, were badly affected by 
interest rates which increased as much as 30% on a seasonal loan. Agriculture, and 
consequently food security for the rural people, was negatively affected by the 
auctioning system. However, the government has tried to cushion the effects of 
inflation on the urban poor by continuing to subsidise maize flour. The money 
supply was never contained and grew by as much as 93% between 1986 and 1987 
(Budget speech, 1988). The increased money supply and the continued government 
budget deficits affected the food security situation of the people by fueling inflation.
CONCLUSION
With the decline of the mining industry, Zambia is currently placing increased 
emphasis on the agricultural sector, particularly on maize production. Indeed, food 
security in Zambia is almost synonymous with maize self-sufficiency. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that key agricultural policies that government has recently initiated 
are related to maize production and marketing. By and large, Zambia has shown 
that she is capable of producing sufficient maize, given good rains5. What she now 
needs to do is to consolidate this capacity, as well as review her marketing and 
storage capacities. The various irrigation schemes, both small- and large-scale, need 
to be expanded in order to supplement rainfed agriculture, especially in bad years.
Like the rest of the economy, there is also a need to diversify the agricultural 
sector. In recent years, government has encouraged farmers to grow crops other 
than maize. This is particularly true of the export crops for which the farmers, 
mainly commercial farmers are given good incentives.
74 K.F. Sipula, J.T. Milimo, C. Mwila, and D. Mendamenda
sWith a current demand for marketed maize of 8.5 million bags, the country produced enough to 
meet domestic requirements in 1976, 1977, 1981, 1986, and 1988. The excess demand is met either by 
commercial imports or aid. Zambia has been importing and receiving food aid in the form of maize 
for a long time, ranging from a high of 288,000 mt in 1980 to a low of 68,000 mt in 1982 (MAWD and 
Mills Associates, Ltd., 1986). This year the country has imported maize from Zimbabwe and Kenya 
to make up the shortfall, with about 162,500 mt projected to be imported from Zimbabwe (Times of 
Zambia. April 14, 1988). Part of this consignment (62,500 mt) is from the World Food Programme as 
food assistance.
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